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作者

来源

JOURNAL OF HOUSING AND THE BUILT ENVIRONMENT,Vol.32,Issue4,P.673-691

语言

英文

关键字

Crowding out; Housing subsidy; Tax credit; Intergenerational transfer; Japan; PRIVATE TRANSFERS; HOME-OWNERSHIP; INTERGENERATIONAL TRANSFERS; PUBLIC TRANSFERS; BORROWING CONSTRAINTS; MARKET; HOMEOWNERSHIP; GIFTS; TRANSMISSION; HOUSEHOLDS

作者单位

[Iwata, Shinichiro] Univ Toyama, Fac Econ, 3190 Gofuku, Toyama 9308555, Japan. [Yukutake, Norifumi] Housing Res & Adv Fdn Japan, Tokyo, Japan. Iwata, S (reprint author), Univ Toyama, Fac Econ, 3190 Gofuku, Toyama 9308555, Japan. E-Mail: iwata@eco.u-toyama.ac.jp; yukutake@hrf.or.jp

摘要

Children may receive monetary transfers from their parents when they attempt to purchase a home. This raises the question of whether a homeownership-related subsidy provided by government displaces transfers received from parents. The purpose of this paper is to examine this question empirically, using a sample of Japanese home-buying households that are benefiting from a mortgage tax credit (MTC) as a model case. In the empirical analysis, we offer a test of the effect of the MTC on both the extensive and the intensive margins using the overall sample as well as subsample groups. The empirical results, which use the full sample, indicate that the MTC crowds out parental transfers on both the extensive and the intensive margins. In particular, the estimates of the latter suggest an approximately 100 % displacement. Subsample analysis demonstrates that the crowding-out effect is strengthened when children are young, are of low-income group, and are living in the rental sector previously.