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作者

来源

REGIONAL SCIENCE AND URBAN ECONOMICS,Vol.66,P.132-149

语言

英文

关键字

Fiscal common pool problem; Municipal mergers; Propensity score matching with differences-in-differences; Average treatment effect on treated; Subordinate merger partner; GOVERNMENT; AMALGAMATIONS; POLITICS; COSTS; BEHAVIOR; REFORM; SIZE

作者单位

[Hirota, Haruaki] Musashi Univ, Fac Econ, Nerima Ku, 1-26-1 Toyotama Kami, Tokyo 1768534, Japan. [Yunoue, Hideo] Univ Hyogo, Sch Econ, Nishi Ku, 8-2-1 Gakuen Nishi, Kobe, Hyogo 6512197, Japan. Hirota, H (reprint author), Musashi Univ, Fac Econ, Nerima Ku, 1-26-1 Toyotama Kami, Tokyo 1768534, Japan. E-Mail: hirota@cc.musashi.ac.jp; yunoue@econ.u-hyogo.ac.jp

摘要

The purpose of this paper is to evaluate a fiscal common pool problem in Japanese municipal mergers. Specifically, we investigate whether the merged municipalities rapidly increase their expenditures and bonds just before mergers. Because the likelihood of Japanese municipal mergers depends on a municipality's characteristics such as population size, area, and fiscal conditions, municipal mergers are a non-voluntary and non-random phenomenon in Japan. Therefore, we identify causal effects by applying propensity score matching within a differences-in-differences framework to address the problems of endogeneity bias and sample selection bias. In particular, we focus on the subordinate merger partner in absorption-type mergers. Our results show that the subordinate merger partner suffers from adverse fiscal conditions and creates a fiscal common pool problem in public projects just before mergers.