打印

作者

Sally A. Nuamah

来源

JOURNAL OF URBAN AFFAIRS,Vol.42,Issue4,P.554-570

语言

英文

关键字

作者单位

Princeton University

摘要

In 2009, the federal government of the United States proposed the “turnaround” of the nation’s 5,000 lowest performing public schools. In 2013, nearly 2,000 public schools were closed, in part due to this turnaround effort. An increasing number of these closures occurred in large cities where a majority of those affected were either Black or Latino. Utilizing quantitative data on Chicago, this article examines the impacts of these targeted school closures on public attitudes. The analysis reveals that Whites express high levels of support for school closure despite having very few experiences of their schools being closed. Blacks and Latinos, in contrast, absorb nearly 90% of school closures and express low levels of support toward it. Given that established research finds that Americans typically oppose education policies that undermine public schools, these findings raise serious questions about the role of race in shaping educational attitudes and, ultimately, education policy. Beginning in 2009, the federal government of the United States announced an initiative to turn around 1 5,000 of the nations’ lowest performing public schools within 5 years (U.S. Department of Education, 2010). In 2013 alone, nearly 2,000 public schools were closed across the United States, in part due to the turnaround effort (National Center for Education Statistics, 2013). 2 Theoretically, public schools were closed equally across the United States. In reality, select cities, select neighborhoods, and consequently select populations bore most of the brunt. Significantly, recent large-scale public school closures have occurred in large cities where a majority of the public school district population are low-income racial minorities. In Chicago and Philadelphia, two of the largest public school districts in the nation, nearly 90% of the students whose schools were threatened for closure in 2012 were Black or Latino (Chicago Public Schools [CPS], 2013; Good, 2016; Lipman, 2015; Pennsylvania Department of Education, 2013). Despite the increasing utilization of these educational reforms, apparently concentrated among mostly disadvantaged minority communities, we still know very little about how those affected communities, and Americans generally, think about these policies. Surveys, at both the national and local level, reveal that Whites, who are not affected by school closures, still express strong support for them, whereas non-Whites, who are affected by school closures, do not (Joyce Foundation, 2013; Phi Delta Kappa, 2013). These findings raise questions about the role of race in understanding attitudes toward public school closure. In particular, do racial minorities view school closures differently than Whites even when we account for other important factors like income? In the case of school closure, I use quantitative data to show that attitudes toward public school closure are stratified by race, with particularly strong attitudes against closure held by Blacks (even when we control for other pertinent factors). I suggest that differences in attitudes toward school closure across racial groups are reflective of their varied experiences as targets of school closure policies and educational policies more generally. Accordingly, the rest of the article is divided into the following sections: The first section provides a critical review of the literature on attitudes toward education reform with a particular focus on the paradoxical attitudes shaping public school closure. The next section reviews the literature on how racial differences in attitudes toward education policy are shaped. This section is then followed by a discussion on the specific expectations I have for various populations, before describing the data, methods, and strategies for analysis. I then present the findings and conclude with a discussion of them in relationship to broader claims of the article. The paradox of educational attitudes Studies on attitudes toward education consistently find that Americans express a strong commitment to public schools and thus typically oppose proposals that are perceived as undermining them (Henig, 1995; Howell & West, 2009; Jacobsen & Saultz, 2012). Americans’ strong commitment to public schools remains even when they are presented with alternatives such as vouchers—the use of government funds to attend private schools—or different schooling options such as charter schools—independently operated educational institutions (see Howell & Peterson, 2006; Loveless, 2007). Furthermore, they view quality public schools as key contributors to community satisfaction even for those without children (Neal & Waltling-Neal, 2012). Collectively, then, a majority of Americans have traditionally espoused a positive perception of public schools and their utility in society. Ironically, recent surveys on Americans’ views on public school closures complicate their claims to support public schools (Joyce Foundation, 2013; Phi Delta Kappa, 2013). Although there exist very few large-scale surveys on the topic, one of the only existing surveys (conducted in 2013) asked the question, “To save money, some school districts are closing neighborhood schools because of declining student enrollment, causing students to attend another public school. Do you favor or oppose this process?” The findings revealed that a near majority of citizens expressed support for public school closures. From the survey, it appears that although most Americans support public schools, they also support their closure. Yet, most important is what these data reveal when support for school closure is disaggregated by race. The analysis reveals support for closure at nearly 50% for White parents versus slightly above 30% for non-White parents, according to a national study conducted by Phi Delta Kappa (2013). This racial divide in attitudes toward school closure was also found in a local survey conducted on Chicago (Joyce Foundation, 2013). Both findings suggest the potential role of race in explaining the seemingly divided attitudes expressed by Americans about public school closures. Racial differences in educational attitudes Indeed, there exists a robust literature on racial attitudes toward a number of public policies, including education, welfare, and criminal justice (for review, see Schuman, 1997). As the literature relates specifically to educational issues, the majority of studies have focused on affirmative action and school integration (Bobo, 1983; Kinder & Sears, 1981; Kluegel & Smith, 1983; Kuklinski, Cobb, & Gilens, 1997). In terms of affirmative action, although a majority of Americans support the idea of the policy overall, Blacks and Whites disagree on the approach that should be utilized. More specifically, support for affirmative action by Whites declines significantly when the term preferences or quotas or references to the equality of outcome versus opportunity are introduced. Similarly, Whites’ support for integration has nearly reversed since the 1990s, from majority nonsupport to majority support, yet very few White Americans support policies such as busing that would intervene to make integrated schools work (see, for example, Hochschild, 2006). Select surveys and a relatively recent study examine racial differences in attitudes toward educational reforms such as charter schools and school funding, but have found relatively weak links to racial group identification (Bushaw & McNee, 2009; Tate, 1994). There exist very few (if any) studies on attitudes toward school closure. School closure policy, like vouchers and charter schools, is not race-based in intent, but their impact is racially stratified. Furthermore, public schools remain one of the central sources of political and socioeconomic stability and viability in the minority communities they most affect (Caref, Hainds, Hilgendorf, Jankov, & Russell, 2012; De La Torre & Gwynne, 2009; Lipman, 2009). For instance, in many cities, Blacks achieved their first political successes in the leadership of the public school system (Rich, 1996). In fact, in Henig, Hula, Orr, and Pedescleaux’s (1999) investigation of public schools in Atlanta, Washington, DC, Baltimore, and Detroit, they find that post-1970, “the school systems became the first agency of local government in which Blacks dominated” (p. 55). Upon achieving leadership of these systems, Blacks hired other Blacks as employees and targeted contracts such as those to serve lunch and/or provide janitorial services to mostly Black businesses. These actions are illustrative of how public school systems evolve to symbolize Black political power, Black employment, and Black business. In addition to political and economic stability, public schools act as central sites for acquiring civic skills critical for political participation (Bischoff, 2008; Hochschild & Scovronick, 2003; Levinson, 2012). Significantly, they act as an alternative source of child care for parents before and after school and are co-located with critical health services for communities where hospitals or health clinics have closed (Dryfoos, 2000). Consequently, the shutting down of a school affects not only the school itself but also the social, political, and economic empowerment of the Black community. Thus, although there exists no research on racial differences in attitudes toward school closure, one would expect racial identities to be at the center of these opinions. Constructing school closure as non-race-based policy: The case of Chicago In order to examine the potential impacts of racial identities on attitudes toward closure, I focus on the case of school closures in Chicago. The Chicago public school system began officially closing down schools in 2001 under then-CEO Arne Duncan. The justification provided for the policy was to respond to schools that performed persistently poorly (See Duncan, 2006). These policies continued under the 2004 “Renaissance 2010” policy, which acted as a “portfolio management approach” to improving schools by developing shared metrics for evaluating schools, and thus determining which schools to close, in order to make space for the creation of new schools. In particular, the policy aimed to close up to 60 schools, based on low performance, in hopes of making room for 100 new schools by 2010 (Bulkley, Henig, & Levin, 2010). Nonetheless, even after Duncan left, these policies continued in 2012 under the new CEO of CPS, Barbara Byrd Bennet. CPS officials provided the public with the following statement as a justification for the use of the policy: Chicago has experienced a significant population decline—it has 145,000 fewer school age children today than it did in 2000, centered primarily on the south and west sides. This population decline has been the primary driver of underutilized schools in our District—CPS has space for 511,000 students but only 403,000 are enrolled. (CPS, 2012) The above reasoning provided by CPS for school closure frames the policy as a product of population loss in particular areas of the city. According to CPS, the decline in student population created an underutilization crisis—where there are more seats than students in a given classroom. As a response to the crisis, CPS proposed in November 2012 a list of 330 schools that could potentially be closed. By June 2013, 48 of the original 330 schools were closed, the highest number of school closings in a single year in U.S. history (School Reform Commission, 2013). 3 By closing schools, CPS claimed that it would be able to not only resolve the underutilization issue but also to “redirect those dollars to ALL schools, then … make investments that support student growth through new technology, AC, libraries, art/music, more counselors and nurses, and others” (North-Lawndale, 2013). On the surface, the policy makes sense. It seeks to resolve a clear problem, population decline, while also ensuring that the resolution results in more resources being made available to support students. If the policy is read this way, one could expect a majority of citizens to support the school closure policy. Yet, of the 77 community areas that make up the city, only seven neighborhoods (across nine ZIP codes) absorbed over 60% of the school closures (see Table 1). Furthermore, although Blacks made up 48% of the public school population, 88% of them were affected by the school closure policy. Clearly, then, the use of the school closure policy in Chicago resulted in uneven consequences for Blacks.The paradox of educational attitudes: Racial differences in public opinion on school closureAll authorsSally A. Nuamahhttps://doi.org/10.1080/07352166.2017.1360734Published online:30 October 2017 Table 1. ZIP codes with highest number of school closures by income and percentage Black in 2013. CSVDisplay Table Despite the policy’s racially disparate impacts, CPS officials classified it as nominally nonracial. I argue, however, that Blacks, and to some extent Latinos, still oppose these policies at significantly higher rates, even when we account for other factors such as income, in part due to their varied experiences with racially targeted policies and thus varied perceptions of themselves as shared policy targets of school closure. Policy targets and racial identities First, it is important to clarify what I mean by shared policy targets in this analysis. Literature on policy feedback, social construction, and participatory democratic theory demonstrate how policy, by design, often targets particular groups—for example, Social Security targets the elderly, and the G.I. Bill targets veterans. In the process of targeting particular groups, policies send messages to citizens about who is eligible and who is not. These messages of eligibility create boundaries that by default enable certain social constructions about the targeted group. Citizens internalize these social constructions, thereby shaping their perceptions of their value and status in society. These perceptions can influence attitudes toward government, bureaucracy, and democracy at large (Ingram & Schneider, 1995; Pierson, 1993; Smith & Ingram, 1993). Given the fixed and targeted nature of the school closure policy, one would expect citizens’ experiences with the process of closure to influence their attitudes in similar ways described to those described in the literature. Yet, policy feedback does not account for citizens who are not direct targets of a policy but still perceive themselves as such. Indeed, individuals may hold the same feelings as those directly targeted, if they consider themselves potentially subjected to the same or similar consequences. Accordingly, I develop a broader, two-part definition of experience as a policy target, one of which is direct, as an actual target of the policy, and the other of which is indirect, as a perceived target of the policy (versus those who have no connection to the policy at all). More specifically, actual targets include teachers, staff, and parents who are affiliated with the school threatened for closure and thus directly subjected to the policy’s processes and consequences. A perceived target primarily refers to an individual who may have indirect exposure to the policy, as a resident near a targeted school and/or a person who shares similar demographic characteristics to those actually targeted but who is in no way subjected to the closure process directly. Given that a majority of closures took place in majority minority neighborhoods, the latter category accounts for the possibility that a person may have felt targeted simply as a person of color. Accordingly, although I expect those directly targeted to have particular kinds of feelings that are shaped by their experience, those indirectly targeted might still hold similar feelings, although perhaps spun by different rationales. Theoretically, citizens who are direct (actual) or indirect (perceived) targets of the policy should hold the strongest attitudes against closures. Alternatively, if an individual is not directly or indirectly affected by the closure process, the person is classified as a nontarget in this analysis. One would expect nontargets to have ambivalent or nonattitudes, if not sympathetic attitudes, especially given that most Americans support public schools. Black public opinion It is important to note that most of the analysis is centered on the experiences of Blacks because they are most directly affected, numerically, by school closure. It is well established in the literature that Blacks tend to express distinctly different attitudes from their majority counterparts on several policy issues. Blacks’ divergent attitudes are attributed to their shared experiences with discrimination in the United States. These shared experiences have contributed to shared political ideologies that are then reflected in their policy preferences (Barker, 1988; Dawson, 1994, 2011; Lieberson & Waters, 1988; Pinderhughes, 1987). Dawson and Wilson (1991) suggested that as Blacks’ economic situations improved, their shared identities would weaken. Yet, later works revealed that racial identities only strengthened as economic status improved (Dawson, 1994; Hochschild, 1993, 1996; Tate, 1994). This incongruity has been explained by the slow economic progress of Blacks, overall, and their continued experiences with discrimination in majority White spaces at the workplace, in addition to the fact that Blacks continue to live in segregated neighborhoods stratified by race and class (Massey & Denton, 1993). Consequently, despite the removal of traditional forms of overt racism such as Jim Crow and upward mobility for a majority of Blacks in the post–civil rights era, Blacks continue to maintain fairly strong collective attitudes relative to non-Black groups. Certainly, Black attitudes are not as coherent as traditionally portrayed. Gender, ethnicity, and sexuality, for example, continue to contribute to heterogeneity within Black political behavior (Cohen, 1999; Dawson, 2001; Gay & Tate, 1998; Harris-Lacewell, 2004). Focusing on the issue of HIV/AIDS, Cohen (1999) describes how the broad stigma attached to the AIDS epidemic stratified the typically unified Black community by promoting racial elitism and, consequently, racial hierarchies. These racial hierarchies encourage members of the Black community who are non-male and/or non-heterosexual to defer to the interests of the group, even if at the expense of his or her own interest. Ethnicity further complicates Blacks’ heterogeneous attitudes. As Rogers (2006) explains in his work on Afro-Caribbean immigrants, although Caribbean/West Indians are politically incorporated in the United States as Black (Black), they maintain ties to their homelands that continue to interact with their experiences in the United States (see also Greer, 2013). Both studies demonstrate how racial attitudes are constantly competing with other identities. Still, the relationship between Blacks’ racial identities and policy preferences remain strong. Although Gay and Tate (1998) find that gender and race are mutually reinforcing for the attitudes of Black women, for example, they ultimately conclude that racial identification plays a more powerful role than gender in their political preferences. Most important, as recent as 2011, Dawson’s investigation of Black political attitudes revealed that nearly three quarters of all Blacks, across class, believed that what happens to their racial groups affects them (discussed in more detail below). Ultimately, then, the study of Black political attitudes continues to confirm the important role of race for the construction of political worldviews and formation of collective identities. Collective racial identities and school closure Expectations Established research on group consciousness and linked fate provides a specific approach for understanding how attitudes are formed along racial lines. Group consciousness refers to one’s identification as a member of a respective group (Gurin & Markus, 1989; Jackman & Jackman, 1973). Linked fate (also called the Black utility heuristic) reflects one particular way of operationalizing group consciousness. The concept refers to a cognitive racial cue utilized among Blacks to dictate their political interests (Dawson, 1994). This conceptualization of group consciousness discusses the political decisions of Blacks as rational calculations. Both concepts are perhaps best defined as Blacks’ expression of how much they view their life chances as connected to other members of their respective racial group. Using this literature, one would expect Blacks to express strong attitudes toward closure if they view the policy issue as affecting members of their same racial group. However, I view group consciousness and linked fate as only providing a partial explanation for attitudes toward closure because it fails to account for how Blacks determine their status as policy targets. Understanding their role as policy targets allows for a more complex examination of attitudes as nuanced and fluid because of citizens’ abilities to use their actual policy experiences to form attitudes rather than relying on blanket references to race and belonging. In terms of public school closures, in particular, the racially disparate impacts of the policy, in the context of Blacks’ historical relationship to race relations in the United States, at large, likely contribute to a shared perception among Blacks across the city that they, too, are targets of school closure (even though these closures are only experienced by a small percentage of the Black population directly). I argue that these perceptions of self as policy targets of school closure contribute to Blacks’ racial identities and thus Blacks’ political preferences. Accordingly, I expect Blacks, whether direct or indirect targets of closure, to express negative attitudes toward the policy. As it relates to other groups, various and multiple group identities attached to a single ethnic minority group make it difficult to expect the same patterns we see among Blacks. Furthermore, some racial minorities in the United States might not view themselves as part of the subordinate (e.g., Latinos who identify as White; Masuoka & Junn, 2013). Gay (2004), for example, demonstrates how racial minorities who feel fully integrated into the residential context of higher income neighborhoods identify less with their respective racial group, whereas those who do not feel fully integrated maintain a strong identification with their racial group. Furthermore, Cain, Citrin, and Wong (2000), in their study of Latinos, find that although intergenerational and ethnic divisions may discourage group identity, recent immigration legislation can reactivate these group identities (see also De La Garza, 2004). These findings suggest that examinations of racial group identities and its influence on attitudes should account for the context in which these groups are situated. 4 In the case of Chicago, 86% of the public school population is either Black or Latino. Thus, these are the racial groups that stand to lose resources when schools in their neighborhoods are closed. In terms of Latinos especially, because the activation of their racial identities are largely based on context, the racially targeted nature of the closure policy, in particular, should shape their attitudes in similar ways to Blacks. Thus, I expect Latinos to also express negative attitudes toward public school closure (although at lower levels). Ultimately, the above expectations may suggest that negative reactions toward the school closure policy by Blacks and Latinos may be mostly interest driven (and not nearly as much about direct policy experience, per se). It is important to note that the policy was promoted as one that would in fact lead to more resources for these communities through the consolidation of schools. My expectation, however, is that both Blacks and Latinos did not in fact believe that it would. I argue that these skeptical attitudes are a product of their experiences as targets of school closure and other similar policies. For example, Logan and Burdick-Will (2015) find that attending a charter school only slightly offsets the educational disadvantages that Black and Latino students in high-poverty areas face when compared to Whites. Thus, even when alternatives to traditional public schools are utilized by Blacks and Latinos, they do not necessarily have positive educational experiences similar to those of their majority counterparts. Yet, despite Whites’ dissimilar educational experiences and nontarget status, given their general support for public schools, I would expect Whites to report sympathetic attitudes, in line with those expressed by Blacks and Latino affected (rather than take the opposite position). Summary of expectations In sum, I expect attitudes toward school closure to vary across groups. In particular, I expect that being a target of the closure policy should influence negative attitudes toward it. I expect that these attitudes will be most pronounced by race. Accordingly, I expect Blacks to express the most oppositional attitudes, followed by Latinos and then Whites. I use individual level survey data to test these claims. Research design Data For this investigation, I construct a data set on school closings in Chicago. The data set includes information on the address and free/reduced-price lunch level of each school closed, on the closing list, or disrupted by another CPS action from 2012–2013. 5 The ZIP codes of the schools are then linked to ZIP code–level census data collected from the American Community Survey 2009–2013 estimates (U.S. Census Bureau, 2013). The linked data are then merged by ZIP code to the 2013 survey on educational attitudes of parents conducted collectively by the Joyce Foundation, the Chicago Tribune, and the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago. The survey sampled 1,020 individuals, over half (520) of whom are parents in CPS, and featured multiple questions about education reform, two of which ask specifically about public school closure. 6 The survey also oversampled Black respondents, which enables a more reliable and robust analysis of Black attitudes. Additional demographic data on the survey population are included in the Figure 1 and Table 2.The paradox of educational attitudes: Racial differences in public opinion on school closureAll authorsSally A. Nuamahhttps://doi.org/10.1080/07352166.2017.1360734Published online:30 October 2017 Table 2. Descriptive data on survey respondents by race, level of closure, and income. CSVDisplay Table The paradox of educational attitudes: Racial differences in public opinion on school closureAll authorsSally A. Nuamahhttps://doi.org/10.1080/07352166.2017.1360734Published online:30 October 2017 Figure 1. Support for school closure by race in Chicago (CPS, 2013). Based on data from the Joyce Foundation (2013). Display full size Figure 1. Support for school closure by race in Chicago (CPS, 2013). Based on data from the Joyce Foundation (2013). Description of variables Dependent variable The majority of the analysis relies on a single dependent variable that asks about attitudes toward closure. This question basically outlines the official explanation for school closures in the city of Chicago. That is, the question echoes the dominant narrative, which makes it a conservative test for my hypotheses related to Blacks and Latinos. The specific question asked is the following: Chicago Public Schools recently announced plans to close some schools that are serving less than half the number of students that the school was built to serve in order to help balance its budget and free up resources to support the remaining schools more efficiently. Would you agree or disagree with a policy that would close these underenrolled schools in order to balance the district’s budget? The question gives the respondent the option to select one of five choices: (1) strongly agree, (2) somewhat agree, (3) somewhat disagree, (4) strongly disagree, and (5) neither agree nor disagree. I code the variable as a dummy: 1 for agree. 7 Other independent variables It is important to note that the survey examined does not include a question about experiences with public school closure. Thus, I develop multiple proxy variables that aim to capture the characteristics of a potential school closure target in order to test my expectations. According to CPS data, over 85% of public school children qualify for free or reduced lunch (see Table 3). Furthermore, a majority of closures occurred in neighborhoods that had median incomes ranging between $20,000 and $50,000. Therefore, I construct a dummy variable at the individual level for earning an income below $50,000. In short, I use one’s low-income status as a proxy for one’s experience as a target of closure.The paradox of educational attitudes: Racial differences in public opinion on school closureAll authorsSally A. Nuamahhttps://doi.org/10.1080/07352166.2017.1360734Published online:30 October 2017 Table 3. Percentage of public school population in top three cities affected by closure, by race and income. CSVDisplay Table Given that parents, in particular, have strong attitudes toward education and are the adult stakeholders most directly affected by closure decisions, I include a dummy variable in the analysis on whether the individual is a parent or not (Parent). Because race is closely linked to probability of being selected for closure. I also develop dummy variables for Black and non-Black (Black), White and non-White (White), and Latino and non-Latino (Latino). Additionally, I construct a variable that measures whether or not a person lives within a ZIP code that had a school on the closure list. 8 In this way, I am using one’s status as resident of an area in which a threat of school closure occurred as a proxy for one’s experience as target of closure. Finally, I construct additional individual-level controls including a dummy variable for gender and whether the individual is affiliated with the school district (outside of being a parent). Contextual/aggregate-level controls At the contextual level (ZIP code), I construct controls based on factors that can potentially confound the results if left unobserved. One such variable is the percentage of school-age children in a ZIP code. 9 Indeed, if an area has a high percentage of school-age children, this may bias their attitudes toward education. Thus, I include a variable for school-aged children—measured as the percentage of population in ZIP code 15 years of age and younger. Furthermore, given that education level has been found to strongly correlate with political knowledge, engagement, and participation, I construct a variable for education that measures the percentage of individuals age 25 and older who have completed high school or less. 10 Given the population I am focusing on, there is a need to control for factors such as poverty and outmigration. I control for poverty through the inclusion of a family poverty level variable that measures the percentage of persons in a ZIP code who are under the poverty level. In addition, I control for percentage of rented or owned homes per ZIP code. For population shifts (migration), I construct a variable that measures the percentage of vacant housing in a neighborhood. According to Lee and Lubienski’s (2017) work on closures in Chicago, “the school closures in 2013 were mostly clustered around two areas with high vacancy rates” (p. 59). Because school closures are framed as a response to an underenrollment issue caused by population shifts, this variable aims to account for these shifts in the analysis. Tests and analysis Given the dichotomous dependent variable and the multiple individual and aggregate-level independent variables, the analysis is primarily based on logistic regression models. 11 Using these data and measures, I test my expectation that being a target—whether direct or indirect—of the closure policy should influence negative attitudes toward the policy. For the analysis, I begin with a bivariate regression between the independent and dependent variables of interest. I then construct a multivariate logistic regression that includes individual-level variables, specifically race (Black, Latino, or White), gender, income below $50,000, parental status, affiliation with a school, and being on the school closure list. The next models include individual- and aggregate-level variables together. The aggregate variables are from census ZIP code–level data and include percentage of school-age children, percentage with high school education or under, percentage earning income under $50,000, percentage of vacant homes, percentage foreign born, percentage under the federal poverty level, and percentage of rental units. Given the difficulty in interpreting coefficients in logit models, I report marginal effects because they enable a calculation of a select independent variable, relative to other independent variables, on the dependent variable. As stated above, the tests should reveal a strong relationship between being a target—operationalized above as either being Black/Latino, low-income, parent, and/or on the list of schools threatened for closure—and attitudes toward closure. In particular, being a target should have an independent effect on attitudes toward closure across all models in a positive direction. Because being Black or Latino acts as a critical proxy for actual and perceived targets of school closure in this study, it should be the case that being Black or Latino should have the most negative attitudes toward closure. Findings The output from the bivariate regressions reveals that being a parent alone does not have a significant relationship to attitudes toward school closure. However, the output does reveal a significant relationship in the direction expected of being on the school closure list and earning an income under $50,000 on attitudes toward closure. In particular, living in a neighborhood with a school threatened for closure is associated with a 0.46-point increase in the probability of opposing closure, and earning an income under $50,000 is associated with a 0.69-point increase in opposing school closure. In the models that focus specifically on race (Black, Latino, and White), the output reveals a significant relationship between race and attitudes toward closure, with being Black and Latino associated with a 1.2-point and 0.93-point increase, respectively, in negative attitudes toward closures compared to Whites’ (the baseline group) positive attitudes. Without the inclusion of controls, at the most basic level, the bivariate regressions suggest that there is a potential relationship between race, living in a neighborhood with a school on the closure list, and income on attitudes toward school closure in the direction expected (see Table 4).The paradox of educational attitudes: Racial differences in public opinion on school closureAll authorsSally A. Nuamahhttps://doi.org/10.1080/07352166.2017.1360734Published online:30 October 2017 Table 4. Bivariate logit regression predictors of opposition to school closure. CSVDisplay Table Once individual-level controls are added, having an income under $50,000 and being Black or Latino remains positively related to opposition to school closure, in contrast to Whites, whereas being a parent and living in an area that has a school on the closure list does not have a significant relationship to closure in either direction (see Table 5, Model 1). The same relationships, although at lower levels, are found once aggregate level controls are added (see Table 5, Model 2).The paradox of educational attitudes: Racial differences in public opinion on school closureAll authorsSally A. Nuamahhttps://doi.org/10.1080/07352166.2017.1360734Published online:30 October 2017 Table 5. Multiple logit regression predictors of opposition to school closure. CSVDisplay Table More specifically, as displayed in Figure 2, earning less than $50,000 is associated with a 0.16-point increase in the probability of a person opposing closure, and being Black or Latino is associated with 0.20- and 0.17-point increases, respectively, at the individual level. At the contextual level, when aggregate variables are added, earning an income under $50,000 is associated with a 0.09-point increase in the probability of a person opposing closure, and being Black or Latino is associated with 0.16- and 0.10-point increases, respectively. There are no consistently significant relationships between the interactions and the dependent variable or the contextual controls and the dependent variable (see Table 6).The paradox of educational attitudes: Racial differences in public opinion on school closureAll authorsSally A. Nuamahhttps://doi.org/10.1080/07352166.2017.1360734Published online:30 October 2017 Table 6. Multiple logit regression predictors of opposition to school with interactions. CSVDisplay Table The paradox of educational attitudes: Racial differences in public opinion on school closureAll authorsSally A. Nuamahhttps://doi.org/10.1080/07352166.2017.1360734Published online:30 October 2017 Figure 2. Marginal effects of race and income on opposition to closure. Display full size Figure 2. Marginal effects of race and income on opposition to closure. The results ultimately show that race and income under $50,000 have the strongest associations with attitudes toward closure. These findings are significant at both the individual and aggregate (contextual) levels. It is important to note, though, that the output suggests that race plays the most central role in explaining attitudes toward school closure. In particular, being Black is associated with the highest probability of opposing the closure policy, at the highest level of significance (.001), and this is consistent even at the contextual level. Being Latino is also associated with high levels of opposition to closure, although the statistical significance lowers when contextual variables are added (.05). Whites, the baseline group, have opposite attitudes toward school closures when compared to Blacks and Latinos. These findings are significant at both the individual and contextual levels (.05). In sum, there are clear differences in public attitudes toward school closure across Blacks, Latinos, and Whites. Whereas Blacks and Latinos express low levels of support for school closure, Whites express high levels of support for school closure. Limitations To further test these findings, future work on this topic would perhaps benefit from a survey experiment that asks varied questions on public school closure in order to better determine how much the phrasing of the question alters responses. Furthermore, additional survey data would enable an understanding of exactly who experiences school closure. In particular, these data would facilitate more precise measures of experience and thus replace the proxy variables utilized in the analysis. It would also be helpful to collect data on attitudes toward school closures across multiple years and contexts in order to clarify whether or not racial differences are dependent on when the question is being asked and/or in what city. Finally, qualitative data on citizens’ responses to the school closure policy would help to better explain the results. Discussion Utilizing quantitative data, I show that attitudes toward school closure are stratified by income and, most important, by race. As they relate to race, the findings reveal that a majority of Blacks and Latinos hold negative attitudes toward school closures, whereas a majority of Whites hold positive attitudes. Given that Americans professed support for public schools, the racial differences revealed in attitudes toward school closure raise important concerns about the nature of this commitment and by whom it is made. For instance, one would expect Whites to have indifferent—if not sympathetic—attitudes, due to their limited experience with the closure policy. In order for Whites to support closures and not be perceived as anti-public schools, one must assume that they believe that closing schools will result in better public schools for all. Yet, there is in fact very little evidence that it will (De La Torre & Gwynne, 2009; Valencia, 1984). Furthermore, those directly affected by the policy publicly express their opposition to it and their disbelief in the dominant narrative that it will lead to better outcomes. Finally, as mentioned earlier in the article, most Americans generally appear to oppose policies such as vouchers or charters that can be read as undermining public schools when presented in relation to traditional public schools. Thus, it is unclear why Whites would then support the downright closure of public schools. Additionally, one might expect Latinos to hold distinctly different attitudes than do Blacks given the lack of linked fate typically associated with the group, and across racial groups, in established research. The questions these expectations raise is whether feelings of linked fate or racial identification are more consequential than direct experience with the policy or actual exposure to the threat of school closure. My guess is that experience as a policy target and linked fate feelings interact. In other words, scholars would benefit from understanding how linked fate can be used as a heuristic device for interpreting policy experience. As previously mentioned, many alternatives to public schools, such as charter schools, do not typically benefit Blacks and Latinos in the same way they do Whites. Thus, in this study on school closures, Latino attitudes look strikingly similar to those of Blacks perhaps due to their similar overall educational experiences. These similar educational experiences may ignite linked fate or, rather, shared racial group identities, which then shape public attitudes. Nonetheless, future research on this topic should explore the relationship between linked fate, policy experience, and political attitudes more closely. Ultimately, these findings demonstrate the continued salience of race for policy preferences. Most important, this work highlights how nominally nonracial policies that have racially disparate impacts structure policy attitudes. By constructing one of the only academic investigations of how citizens think about school closings and why, the article illuminates a mediating factor, experience as a policy target, that to varying degrees probably shapes the link between race and attitudes toward many policies—not just school closures. As Dawson (1994) explains in his work, as long as discrimination exists, Blacks will continue to express divergent attitudes when compared to their majority counterparts. In that case, the study of Black political attitudes provides a lens into Blacks’ perceptions of their experiences with discrimination in the country. This article finds evidence for similar feelings among Latinos as well. Whites, then, have to be attentive to the ways in which disengagement with racial consequences of the policy might actually result in the perpetuation of discrimination. In the end, racial differences in attitudes matter not only because they essentially symbolize the role of race and in some cases racism in the country but also because they challenge the ability for groups to work across racial lines and toward political and social progress. Still, school closures are particularly important to study because public schools continue to act as essential vehicles for ensuring that all citizens are able to acquire the civic skills necessary for upholding democracy, in addition to the life skills critical for securing better life chances. For Blacks and Latinos especially, public schools remain institutions that represent the surest mechanism for achieving racial equality, ensuring social mobility, translating civic skills, and improving political participation. Yet, once these schools are removed, these groups often do not get them back. Thus, closures come to represent the last institution left in these communities but with no viable replacement. It is no surprise, then, that Blacks and Latinos express such negative attitudes toward closure, because these attitudes are implicated in their concerns about their contemporary political and socioeconomic position relative to other racial groups in the United States. Finally, Black and Latino attitudes toward school closures have implications for democratic responsiveness. If democracy requires policymakers to respond to the demands of the people, then attitudes matter because they reflect what the people want. Yet, the example of public school closures demonstrates what happens when policy attitudes are divided; the opinions of the nondominant, marginalized, and affected groups are overlooked. Indeed, irrespective of whether or not the school district believed that their school closure policy was justified, for the majority of Blacks and Latinos affected it was not. Blacks’ and Latinos’ strong disagreement, even when confronted with a policy rationale that promotes public school closures as beneficial to them, demonstrates a deep division between citizens of color and their government. Nonetheless, in the face of resistance from those affected, policymakers proceeded with their actions, while supported by a dominant White majority that was nearly universally excluded from the experience of involuntary school closure. In so doing, policymakers further relegated marginalized groups to the sidelines of society. Thus, even if closing schools were the most efficient solution for resolving issues of underenrolled classrooms, it undermines the broader function of public schools as reducers of inequality and, ultimately, anchors of democracy. Acknowledgments I am grateful to Reuel Rogers, Traci Burch, Rogers Smith, Marc Meredith, and Daniel Gillion for their invaluable feedback on earlier versions of this research. Thanks also to Rutgers University—both Newark and New Brunswick—and the University of Pennsylvania and Northwestern University where I presented previous versions of this article. The scholarly community at these institutions provided extremely thoughtful feedback. Finally, thank you to the editors at the Journal of Urban Affairs and the anonymous reviewers for thorough comments and helpful suggestions. Table 1. ZIP codes with highest number of school closures by income and percentage Black in 2013. ZIPNumber% ClosedIncome (%) a % Black60628104.0048,3816.5760622114.0069,8895.1360621114.0027,72797.8160653156.0056,15131.7760617166.0038,48710.9460623176.0035,2836.7560612228.0040,16417.9760624249.0068,3244.12606092710.0036,33495.54Total no. closed b 153 (262)57.00  Total no. ZIP codes c 9 (36)    Note. a Income represents median income per ZIP code. b (262) represent total number of schools closed overall. c (36) total number of ZIP codes with school closures. Table 2. Descriptive data on survey respondents by race, level of closure, and income.      % Below $50,000RaceTotalIncome below $50,000ClosedNon-closedAllClosedBlack347176128475073Hispanic18411121906019White4239626702327 Table 3. Percentage of public school population in top three cities affected by closure, by race and income.   Black populationLow-income populationCityClosed schools% Affected in school systemTotal population in school system% Affected in school systemTotal population in school systemChicago4987429476New York2255308173Philadelphia2385559381 Note. Data from local school data for Chicago, Philadelphia, New York. Table 4. Bivariate logit regression predictors of opposition to school closure. IndividualParentLow-income a Closed listRank b RaceModel(1)(2)(3)(4)(5)Parent0.112     (0.134)    Income of $50,000 or less 0.687***     (0.140)   Closed list neighborhood  0.458***     (0.137)  High closure   0.623***     (0.159) Medium closure   0.771***     (0.196) Low closure   0.733***     (0.263) Black    1.121***     (0.155)Hispanic    0.934***     (0.188)Constant−0.310***−0.547***−0.436***−0.615***−0.851*** (0.096)(0.092)(0.087)(0.100)(0.108) Note. The coefficient of the independent variable is the value without parentheses; the standard error is the value within parentheses. a Low-income = Income $50,000 or below. b Rank = level of closure per ZIP code. Significant at ***.001 (highest), **.05, *.010 (lowest). Table 5. Multiple logit regression predictors of opposition to school closure. Model(1)(2) Individual   Black0.960***0.745*** (0.175)(0.211)Hispanic0.806***0.493** (0.199)(0.220)Parent0.1100.098 (0.145)(0.147)Gender0.2280.196 (0.151)(0.152)Affiliation0.1690.194 (0.147)(0.150)Income of $50,000 or less0.427***0.343** (0.155)(0.159)Closed list neighborhood0.0790.013 (0.160)(0.197) Aggregate   Age under 15 0.0001  (0.030)High school education or less 0.011  (0.017)Rent −0.010  (0.009)Family poverty 0.032  (0.022)Foreign born 0.005  (0.009)Constant−1.275*** (0.193)−1.444** (0.680) Note. The coefficient of the independent variable is the value without parentheses; the standard error is the value within parentheses. Signficant at ***.001 (highest), **.05, *.010 (lowest). Table 6. Multiple logit regression predictors of opposition to school with interactions. Model(1)(2)(3) Individual ParentBlackHispanicBlack0.735***0.835***0.789*** (0.211)(0.251)(0.218)Hispanic0.525**0.486**0.843*** (0.222)(0.221)(0.311)Parent0.2680.1730.209 (0.189)(0.185)(0.168)Gender0.2060.1970.168 (0.153)(0.153)(0.156)Affiliation0.1980.1950.233 (0.150)(0.150)(0.155)Income of $50,000 or less0.547**0.338**0.382** (0.213)(0.159)(0.165)Closed list neighborhood0.0220.0120.020 (0.197)(0.196)(0.201) Aggregate    High school education or less0.0120.0110.012 (0.015)(0.015)(0.016)Rent−0.010−0.010−0.009 (0.006)(0.006)(0.007)Family poverty0.0310.032*0.030 (0.019)(0.019)(0.020)Foreign born0.0040.0050.006 (0.009)(0.009)(0.010)Interactions   Parent: Income of $50,000 or less−0.422   (0.293)  Parent: Closed0.019   (0.288)  Black: Income of $50,000 or less −0.080   (0.304) Black: Parent −0.194   (0.292) Black: Closed −0.249   (0.330) Hispanic: Income of $50,000 or less  −0.314(0.379)Hispanic: Parent  −0.598   (0.376)Hispanic: Closed  0.383   (0.438)Constant−1.542***−1.467***−1.519*** (0.325)(0.319)(0.379) Note. The coefficient of the independent variable is the value without parentheses; the standard error is the value within parentheses. Signficant at ***.001 (highest), **.05, *.010 (lowest). Notes 1. Turnaround includes the following potential reforms to an educational institution: (a) students stay in the same school and the staff are replaced with new public school staff; (b) students stay and staff are replaced with a charter operator; (c) new standards and strategies are developed to better tailor the needs of students; or (d) the school is permanently shut down. See U.S. Department of Education, Office of Planning, Evaluation and Policy Development (2010) for more info. 2. It is important to note that new schools have been opened but not at the rate of closure, and the schools opened are not traditional public schools (see National Center for Education Statistics, 2011–2013). 3. This most recent round of school closure reflects 40% of total schools closed in Chicago’s history. By some counts, a total of 54 schools were closed. 4. Scholars have shown that we need to specifically consider the political conditions under which group consciousness waxes and wanes (Cohen & Dawson, 1993; McClain, Johnson Carew, Walton, & Watts, 2009). 5. School actions include (a) the phasing out of a school—no longer accepting new students; (b) turnaround—students stay in the school but senior leadership and teachers are replaced; (c) co-location—two schools share the same space; (d) or shut down—the physical building is closed and/or program is discontinued. In this particular analysis, I focus on neighborhoods where a school was physically closed or placed on the closing list. 6. The merging of the data described in this section is essential for the construction of independent variables central to the examination, including, most notably, experience with closure. 7. Unfortunately, the other question that asked about closures was listed as one of several policy responses to an educational deficit. Because respondents had the opportunity to select more than one option, there were not enough observations to index the selection of the closure option with the other question. Furthermore, it was not a closure attitude question, in that it did not ask the respondent to directly express support, or not, for school closure. Thus, the question did not seem appropriate to use. 8. The criteria in 2013 were based on schools that were underenrolled—more seats than students in a given classroom. Once a school was placed on the list by the district, the students and parents of the students who attend the school have to engage in community meetings organized for them by the district. In theory, those who made an effective case were removed from the list, whereas those who did not remained on the list and were eventually shut down. 9. 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Nuamah is a Postdoctoral Fellow at Princeton University with an appointment at the Center for the Study of Democratic Politics and the University Center for Human Values. Her research focuses on the political effects of education reform with a particular emphasis on large-scale public school closure. In the summer of 2018, she will begin a position as an Assistant Professor at Duke University’s Sanford School of Public Policy.