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作者

来源

REGIONAL SCIENCE AND URBAN ECONOMICS,Vol.73,P.30-50

语言

英文

关键字

Tobit models; Cox test; Complete information; Incomplete information; Social interactions; STRATEGIC INTERACTION; TESTS; IDENTIFICATION; SPECIFICATION; INFERENCE; GAMES

作者单位

[Yang, Chao] Shanghai Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Econ, Shanghai, Peoples R China. [Yang, Chao] SUFE, Key Lab Math Econ, Minist Educ, Shanghai, Peoples R China. [Lee, Lung-fei] Ohio State Univ, Dept Econ, Columbus, OH 43210 USA. [Qu, Xi] Shanghai Jiao Tong Univ, Dept Econ, Antai Coll Econ & Management, Shanghai, Peoples R China. Qu, X (reprint author), Shanghai Jiao Tong Univ, Antai Coll Econ & Management, Room 1404,1954 Huashan Rd, Shanghai 200030, Peoples R China. E-Mail: xiqu@sjtu.edu.cn

摘要

In many network data sets, the outcomes of interest are equal to zero for some agents and strictly positive for others. They can be analyzed by Tobit models with social interactions with different assumptions on information structures. Under complete information, all the observables and unobservables are publicly known. Under incomplete information, unobservables and some covariates collected by econometricians can be private information for agents. In practice, both scenarios can be feasible but will lead to different implications. A non-nested Cox-type test is proposed for the specification test. We use the Monte Carlo simulations to demonstrate its small sample properties. When applying our test to study property tax rates among adjacent municipalities in North Carolina, significant competing effects are found under both information structures. However, the Cox test is in favor of the complete information model, which implies a much larger income marginal effects and a much smaller population marginal effects on tax rates, compared to the model with incomplete information.