Do Institutions and Rules Influence Electoral Accessibility and Competitiveness? Considering the 2014 Toronto Ward Elections

《Do Institutions and Rules Influence Electoral Accessibility and Competitiveness? Considering the 2014 Toronto Ward Elections》

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关键字: municipal campaign finance; municipal elections; electoral reform; electoral accessibility; electoral competitiveness; STATE; DETERMINANTS; NONPARTISAN; CANDIDATES; INCUMBENCY; TURNOUT; GENDER; BALLOT; MONEY

作者单位: [Taylor, Zack] Western Univ, Dept Polit Sci, London, ON, Canada. [Taylor, Zack] Western Univ, Local Govt Program, London, ON, Canada. [McEleney, Sandra] York Univ, Program Publ Policy Adm & Law, Toronto, ON, Canada. Taylor, Z (reprint author), Western Univ, Social Sci Ctr, Room 4166, London, ON N6A 5C2, Canada. E-Mail: zack.taylor@uwo.ca

摘要: Electoral and campaign finance reforms are believed to improve the competitiveness of elections and the accessibility of the electoral process; however, the interaction between electoral institutions and competitiveness and accessibility in nonpartisan municipal elections remains understudied. This article examines the City of Toronto, which exemplifies many of the reforms proposed in the American context, including a strict campaign finance regime and low barriers to candidate entry. Analysis of campaign finance disclosure data and candidate characteristics for Toronto's 2014 ward elections reveals that electoral and campaign finance rules increase electoral accessibility while doing little to limit incumbency advantage. We argue that crowded nonpartisan races are low-information environments in which candidates, donors, and voters cannot assess challenger quality, which reinforces incumbent name recognition and access to campaign resources. The Toronto case highlights the limits of institutional and regulatory change as a means of increasing local electoral competitiveness and accessibility.