打印

作者

Irena Baclija Brajnik

来源

URBAN AFFAIRS REVIEW,Vol.60,Issue2,P.

语言

英文

关键字

作者单位

摘要

IntroductionAt the local level, politics is less ideological and focuses primarily on day-to-day public-service delivery policies. John (2001, 9) maintained that the “local government is perceived to administer things that others consider to be dull, such as bin emptying, street cleaning, drainage, and building quality, and it is assumed that the administration and decision-making of these activities is similarly tedious.” This has led to calls for local governments to be managed apolitically (Borja 1996; Doron 2000). There are some indices for which local governments, where administration takes a greater role than politics, perform better than those in which politicians take the lead (Carr 2015; Choi, Feiock, and Bae 2013; Nalbandian et al. 2013; Nelson and Svara 2015; Svara and Watson 2010; Wheeland, Palus, and Wood 2014). Leautier (2006) found that local governments led by a politician with extensive competences have inferior infrastructure and lower incomes than those led by a strong managerial team. Rauch (1998) and Svara (2003) concluded that cities with more influential urban managers (analogous to chief administrative officers [CAOs]) invest more in long-term projects than those with influential mayors. Several studies have indicated that CAOs also play a key role in the modernization of city administration (Daemen and Schaap 2000; Hambleton and Sweeting 1999).Our primary interest is the influence of mayors and CAOs1 in European municipalities. CAOs are the highest-ranking civil servants chosen by the mayor or local council. Comparative research on CAOs in Europe is scarce, with the last comparative survey having been conducted more than twenty-five years ago (UDiTE leadership study of 1996),2 and only few studies exist on CAOs in individual European countries (Dargie 1998; de Borger et al. 1994; Sandberg 1999; Sancino and Turrini 2009). Conversely, a large number of studies exist on CAOs in the United States, which is perhaps because they are major actors in the council–manager type of government.In this study, we utilize data from a mayoral survey (the POLLEADER survey) to observe the role of mayors and CAOs from the perspective of mayors. Generalizing the roles of mayors and CAOs within the frameworks of different local government systems demands particularly cautious interpretation. Although there is substantial proof that the perceived influences of mayors and CAOs correspond to the institutional configuration of different forms of government, there is also proof that they do not correspond fully or very substantially within individual countries (Heinelt et al. 2018; Klausen and Magnier 1998; Mouritzen and Svara 2002; Svara 2006). Thus, the aim of our analyses is to determine whether the size of the municipality is the underlying cause of these variations.According to previous research conducted in the United States, there is a connection between the size and the type of government, but this is not very clear. There is evidence that managers tend to be dominant in smaller cities, whereas mayors are more dominant in larger cities (Morgan and Watson 1992). Meanwhile, a study on council–manager3 cities with more than 200,000 inhabitants showed higher levels of involvement by managers than council members in mission decisions—in determining the goals and strategies of their government—as well as in other dimensions (Svara 1999). We examine the effect of municipality size by hypothesizing that CAOs are more influential than mayors in large municipalities, as the complex environment and challenges of large municipalities call for more professional leadership. Large municipalities are usually urban clusters or, at least, have an urban center. Therefore, for the purpose of our analyses, we presuppose that the larger the municipality, the greater the possibility that it is urban. This is important because urban agglomerations exceed other nonurban communities with regard to the complexity and heterogeneity of common needs. This complexity, in turn, calls for more managerial and less political leadership (Borja 1996; Borja et al. 1997).