打印

作者

Mark Chou

来源

URBAN AFFAIRS REVIEW,Vol.60,Issue2,P.

语言

英文

关键字

作者单位

摘要

IntroductionLocalism—or the valorization of local customs, institutions, and communities over centralized forms of power (Clarke and Cochrane 2013; Pratchett 2004; Stoker 2004; Wills 2016)—is firmly back on the political agenda in many countries following the recent surge of populist support and the local lockdowns put in place to contain the COVID-19 pandemic. Indeed, what both the re-emergence of populism and the early interventions to halt the global spread of COVID-19 revealed, albeit in different ways, is how our localities can comfort and protect us during uncertain times. For populists left behind and threatened by globalization's promise, particular local identities and customs helped safeguard “members of the native group” against “nonnative elements” (Chou, Moffitt and Busbridge 2022; Fitzgerald 2018; Macedo 2021; Mudde 2007, 19). Similarly, the border closures, quarantine mandates, and stay-at-home orders enacted during the early phases of the pandemic—which engendered a heightened localist sensibility if not sentiment in some communities—helped curb the spread of a novel virus before vaccines became widely available (Cresswell 2021).But even before populism and the pandemic reinforced localist orientations and arguments, the concept of localism had already been on the rise (Harmes 2021). We have seen it, for example, in the food sovereignty, buy local, and shop small movements of recent decades (Ayres and Bosia 2011; Ciuchta and O’Toole 2018), not to mention in the myriad efforts to foster more locally owned and oriented media, transportation, and energy initiatives (Hess 2009). The Evergreen Cooperatives in Ohio and the Democracy Collaborative's Community Wealth Building initiative are examples of economic localism that strive to foster community economic development by growing local jobs and community business ownership. In politics and governance, localism has influenced numerous policies and laws; the UK's Localism Act 2011 represents the most prominent example of a policy instrument developed to devolve to local councils, communities, and individuals the responsibility for rebuilding social cohesion and economic resilience (Featherstone et al. 2012; Watkins 2021). More recently, localist ideologies have shaped debates about the potential for local governance organizations, structures, and networks to drive economic, social, and environmental change in cities and urban communities (Katz and Nowak 2017). As vital spokes in the global capitalist economy, the recognition here is that cities and metropolitan centers can offer innovative solutions to entrenched problems. Then there was the pandemic itself, which prompted many local neighborhood organizations and groups to band together to provide mutual aid to family, friends, and neighbors in an extraordinary, if temporary, show of localist solidarity (Kavada 2022; Tolentino 2020). Taken together, these disparate movements, policies, and ideas signify, for some commentators, a “localist revolution” and maybe even a “localism era” (Brooks 2018; Watson 2017).For many, the appeal of such a localist revolution or era is obvious. Indeed, for those currently threatened by the worst aspects of globalization, localism holds the promise of political recognition and empowerment (Briffault 2000; Cramer 2016; Wills 2015). For those hoping to build a more sustainable capitalism that has the potential to harness the positive aspects of technological change and globalization, localism (or new localism to be precise) can enhance local entrepreneurship, competition, and innovation and lead, ultimately, to a more humane economy (Katz and Nowak 2017; Kotkin 2023; Rajan 2023). It is this capacity to create “higher levels of economic inclusion” for more individuals and communities that has led some experts to see new localism, in particular, as an antidote to the nativist localism in right-wing populism as well (Chou 2020; Katz and Nowak 2017, 5; Muggah and Glenny 2017). For those seeking to rejuvenate democratic participation and inclusion more broadly, localism provides incentive to “establish a more direct form of democracy: to give individuals and local communities greater decision-making power in order to bridge the gap between the people and the politicians that work on their behalf” (Parvin 2009, 351). Finally, in elevating “family, friendship, locality, community and country,” localism connects with the communitarian tradition to prefigure a “post-liberal politics” not dictated by left/right, liberal/populist, and libertarian/authoritarian dichotomies (Pabst 2021, 5; Walzer 1983). In this sense, as Sharzer (2012, 9) notes, “[l]ocalism deserves praise for refusing to abandon a humanist vision of the future, and for suggesting we’re not completely powerless against neoliberalism.”But while the attractions of localism may seem clear, the impulse to prioritize the local needs to be subjected to renewed examination—particularly in light of the recent rise of localist sensibilities and arguments. Indeed, as both populism and the pandemic showed, the turn to localism as a political solution may come with unintended consequences capable of producing both good and regrettable outcomes. These dynamics and tendencies need to be better understood and scrutinized. In this review essay, I do this in two ways using two new books as my guide: Trevor Latimer's Small Isn’t Beautiful: The Case Against Localism and Jennifer Vey and Nate Storring's edited collection, Hyperlocal: Place Governance in a Fragmented World. Although very different books, Small Isn’t Beautiful and Hyperlocal are useful complements here because both articulate the precise conditions and circumstances where localist ideas and structures can and cannot thrive as a force for good.Firstly, I use Latimer's book to examine how the localist revolution—much heralded by some—has the potential not only to produce good as well as regrettable outcomes, but increasingly regrettable outcomes in the name of good. For Latimer, understanding the ideological underpinnings of the localist revolution—what he calls normative localism—and subjecting it to empirical scrutiny is crucial to seeing how many of localism's purported virtues are now antithetical to genuine localist causes. Secondly, taking up Latimer's call to examine the empirical evidence in support of localism, I turn to Vey and Storring's collection on hyperlocal place governance organizations to highlight the type of factors and considerations that aid this empirical examination. Through a series of case studies, Vey and Storring's collection does the very thing Latimer theorizes about: subjecting localist solutions to scrutiny, even when the rationale for them seems clear. Doing so, in the case of America's place governance organizations, reveals something paradoxical: that many of these hyperlocal organizations and networks—which emerged out of state and federal neglect—may now be best placed to address the patchwork of inequitable economic growth within and across American communities when connected in to, and coordinated through, the city, state, and federal agencies they complement.