《How Landlords of Small Rental Properties Decide Who Gets Housed and Who Gets Evicted》
打印
- 作者
- Nathaniel Decker
- 来源
- URBAN AFFAIRS REVIEW,Vol.59,Issue1,P.
- 语言
- 英文
- 关键字
- 作者单位
- 摘要
- IntroductionEviction is a major disruptive force for many low-income renters. Over a million households are evicted from their homes every year, and the impact of eviction, whether formal or informal, on households is profound (Desmond et al. 2018). Eviction has been found to cause job loss and mental and physical health declines (Desmond and Kimbro 2015). Eviction begets further housing instability, as past evictions can be discovered during tenant screening and cause tenants to be rejected from units (Desmond 2015). Much of the eviction crisis is driven by a lack of affordable units (Desmond 2018). Renters typically have little to no savings, and often pay half or more of their income for housing (Bhutta et al. 2020; Joint Center for Housing Studies 2020). This means that slight declines in income or increases in expenses can cause tenants to miss payments. Even a change in the timing of income can cause tenants to become delinquent in rent, which can lead to a cascade of late fees and penalties.Whether rent delinquency leads to eviction is up to the rental property owner or manager. When the rent goes unpaid some owners and managers move quickly to file for eviction, but owners often use a range of other methods to get their tenants current, such as developing payment plans, forgiving back rent, or accepting services like property maintenance in lieu of rent (Balzarini and Boyd 2020). For some tenants the first missed payment starts a series of events that leads to them leaving their unit. For others, owners and managers provide leeway that sometimes allows them to stay in their unit.Understanding the differences in how owners and managers deal with rent delinquencies can help policymakers and scholars develop methods to improve the housing stability of low- and moderate-income renters. But it requires grappling with a very diverse and hard-to-study group: the owners and managers themselves. This is particularly true in the stock of 1- to 4-unit small rental properties (SRPs) that, collectively, make up about half the nation’s rental housing stock (US Census Bureau 2020). Portfolio sizes among SRP owners are typically only one or two properties, but a portion of this stock is held by large-scale professionals with dozens or even hundreds of units.There is some evidence that “mom and pop” landlords are less likely to evict their tenants, but it is possible that this difference is driven, not by how they deal with missed rent payments, but by who they choose to rent to. Scholars have found that larger landlords have higher eviction filing rates, particularly higher “serial filing” rates, where owners file for eviction multiple times on the same tenant (Garboden and Rosen 2019; Immergluck et al. 2019; Leung et al. 2020). However the usual cause for filing, rent delinquency, is typically unobserved. This raises the possibility that the reason larger owners file more often is because they are more likely to rent to tenants who go on to miss a rent payment in the first place, while “mom and pop” landlords are less willing to rent to a tenant who appears likely to miss a rent payment. Every landlord wants the rent to be paid in full and on time, but professional owners have systems and policies in place to deal with missed payments, while “mom and pop” landlords need to adjust their whole schedule to deal with a missed payment.To better understand differences in what owners do when the rent is not paid and how this is linked to tenant selection, I surveyed and interviewed landlords of SRPs across the United States and asked how they approached tenant selection and rent non-payment. Using regressions from survey data and qualitative analysis of interviews, I find that, upon rent delinquency, larger portfolio owners are more likely to begin eviction procedures. However I also find a connection between owner’s tenant selection practices and eviction practices. Larger owners are more likely to rent to tenants who go on to miss a rent payment. These findings have a number of implications for programs and policies designed to improve the housing stability of low- and moderate-income renters.