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作者

来源

来源 JOURNAL OF URBAN ECONOMICS,Vol.86,P.98-110

语言

英文

关键字

H4;K4;O17;Business subsidies;Organized crime;Public transfers;Corruption

作者单位

Bank of Italy, Economic Research Department, Branch of Bologna, Piazza Cavour 6, 40124 Bologna, Italy;Trinity College Dublin, Department of Economics, Arts Building, Dublin 2, Ireland;Bank of Italy, Economic Research Department, Branch of Bologna, Piazza Cavour 6, 40124 Bologna, Italy;Trinity College Dublin, Department of Economics, Arts Building, Dublin 2, Ireland

摘要

Business support policies are widespread in advanced countries, to foster employment and productivity. This paper analyses the role of organized crime in the allocation of public subsidies to businesses. We assemble an innovative data set on the Italian mafia at municipality level and test whether mafia-ridden municipalities receive a disproportionally higher amount of funds. We exploit exogenous variation at municipality level to instrument mafia activity and show that the presence of organized crime positively affects the probability of obtaining funding and the amount of public funds. Organized crime is also found to lead to episodes of corruption in the public administration sector. A series of robustness checks confirms the above findings.