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作者

来源

来源 JOURNAL OF URBAN ECONOMICS,Vol.75,P.57-67

语言

英文

关键字

H71;H73;H77;Tax competition;Horizontal taxation externality;Vertical taxation externality;Sales tax;Property tax

作者单位

Department of Economics, Wayne State University, Detroit, MI 48202, United States"}]},{"#name":"correspondence","$":{"id":"cor1;Department of Economics, Wayne State University, Detroit, MI 48202, United States"}]}},"correspondences":{"cor1":{"#name":"correspondence","$":{"id":"cor1

摘要

This paper presents a theoretical model with a uniformly populated line that is divided into local jurisdictions (and/or states). If one level of government imposes sales and residential property taxes, and if the spatial extent of each taxing jurisdiction is positive and finite, then (in Nash equilibrium) the sales tax rate is less than residential property tax rate, housing consumption is suboptimal, and the public good is underprovided in each jurisdiction. If a very large state (or country) is divided into local jurisdictions, and if both levels of government choose tax rates endogenously, then under some assumptions there is an efficient outcome.