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作者

来源

REGIONAL SCIENCE AND URBAN ECONOMICS,Vol.75,P.85-106

语言

英文

关键字

Political economy; Distributive politics; Partisan alignment; Local governments; PARTIES MATTER; GOVERNMENT; TRANSFERS; REDISTRIBUTION; MANIPULATION; ALIGNMENT; OUTCOMES

作者单位

[Carozzi, Felipe] London Sch Econ & Polit Sci, Dept Geog & Environm, Houghton St, London WC2A 2AE, England. [Repetto, Luca] Uppsala Univ, Dept Econ, Box 513, SE-75120 Uppsala, Sweden. Repetto, L (reprint author), Uppsala Univ, Dept Econ, Box 513, SE-75120 Uppsala, Sweden. E-Mail: F.Carozzi@lse.ac.uk; luca.repetto@nek.uu.se

摘要

We study distributive politics inside cities by analysing how local governments allocate investment projects to voters across neighbourhoods. In particular, we ask whether politicians use investment to target their own supporters. To this aim, we use detailed geo-located investment data from Plan E, a large fiscal stimulus program carried out in Spain in 2009-2011. Our main empirical strategy is based on a close-elections regression discontinuity design. In contrast to previous studies which use aggregate data at the district or municipal level we exploit spatial variation in both investment and voter support within municipalities and find no evidence of supporter targeting. Complementary results indicate that voters may be responding to investment by increasing turnout.