The Need for Greater Transparency When Assessing the Performance and Prospects of Melbourne's Rail Franchise Contracts

《The Need for Greater Transparency When Assessing the Performance and Prospects of Melbourne's Rail Franchise Contracts》

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关键字: Rail operations and maintenance outsourcing; rail franchising; Melbourne rail; risk allocations; risk allocation; public policy; SUCCESS

作者单位: [Ashmore, David Patrick; Stone, John; Kirk, Yvonne] Univ Melbourne, Fac Architecture Bldg & Planning, Parkville, Vic 3010, Australia. Ashmore, DP (reprint author), Univ Melbourne, Fac Architecture Bldg & Planning, Parkville, Vic 3010, Australia. E-Mail: david.ashmore@unimelb.edu.au

摘要: Among policymakers and researchers at an international level, there is great interest in the performance of the Melbourne rail franchise model. This review attempts to examine the Melbourne model in an international context and assess the performance of the system under current contracts. Potential flaws are highlighted including lack of information, concerns over performance and contestability, and the treatment of the potential long-term maintenance backlog under short-term contracts. The authors conclude with an overall stance of there needing to be far greater public information transparency to allow proper scrutiny of the effectiveness of these contracts for the public good.